

















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3465 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 










We analyze the long-term effects of firm break-up and ownership change on corporate 
performance. Our analysis is based on a unique data set for a large number of Czech firms 
spanning the period 1996–2005. We employ a propensity score matching procedure to deal 
with endogeneity problems. Our results, which are generally in line with the positive effects 
of firm break-up found in the developed-market literature, show that the initial effects of firm 
break-up are positive but after a certain point they quickly diminish over time. Factors like 
changes in ownership structure and management are to be found behind later improvements in 
the performance of firms. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on corporate divestures in developed countries has provided considerable 
evidence of their positive effects but Moschieri and Mair (2008) in their survey argue 
that our understanding of divestiture is still limited.Since the majority of the existing 
research targets developed economies, the effects of divestitures in emerging markets 
are largely under-researched (e.g., Domadenik et al., 2003; Makhija, 2004; Omran, 
2004; Bartel and Harrison, 2005; Shin, 2008; Hanousek et al., 2009). We contribute to 
the literature by analyzing the break-up of firms in the Czech Republic in the early 
1990’s and this phenomenon’s short- and medium-term effects on firm performance. In 
this analysis we consider a break-up as a means of initial firm restructuring. We also 
account for the potential endogeneity of the break-up and privatization with respect to 
firm performance. Our results show that firm break-up has short- and medium-term 
positive effectsthat vanish thereafter. 
The motivation behind our analysis stems from the fact that in the early 1990’s 
the break-up of firms was the initial type of the restructuring of the large state-owned 
companies in Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies. The break-up of firms 
became one of the most important forms of restructuring because it reduced the size of 
firms, increased the number of firms, and brought in new management (Domadenik et 
al., 2003). Break-up became the main form of early restructuring in the Czech Republic 
(Zemplinerová and Charap, 1994). 
Since the break-up of firms served as a first step in the restructuring pursued by 
the government, it can be hypothesized that in the short-run the break-up of firms 
improves corporate performance as the new firms strive to establish themselves on the 
market and to improve corporate governance.
1 When considering the medium- and long-
run effects of firm break-up the overall picture is rather uncertain. On the one hand, firm 
break-up and certain types of corporate ownership can enhance performance by 
eliminating diseconomies of scale and by serving as a disciplining device for 
management. On the other hand, firm break-up can have a negative effect because of 
substandard corporate governance, weak government coordination and regulation, 
unclear property rights, and the underdeveloped legal and institutional framework that 
exists in emerging market economies (Hanousek et al., 2009). 
                                                 
1 See Roland (1994), who also discusses restructuring and privatization policies along with their pace and 
sequencing.   2
Further, there are different reasons for restructuring between market and 
transformation economies. The need for the restructuring of firms in market economies 
focuses on the trade-off between transaction costs via markets and the internal 
inefficiencies within organizations. However, in the context of transformation 
economies, the focus is on the bargaining between the key decision-makers (such as 
managers, politicians, workers, and new private owners) after restructuring/privatization. 
Grosfeld and Roland (1996) argue that in the early phase of transition, there was high 
expectation that price liberalization, increased product market competition, and tight 
fiscal and monetary policies would create an appropriate environment to which 
managers of state-owned enterprises (SOE) would be forced to adjust. It was also 
expected that the selection of healthy enterprises and the elimination of unprofitable 
ones would start immediately. However, these expectations were not met due to the 
large-scale asset-stripping behavior of SOE managers and skilful protectionism against 
the pressures to change (Grosfeld and Roland 1996). Overall, the need to restructure 
generally inefficient state enterprises and the required privatization processes in the CEE 
region fostered a debate over the sequence: whether restructuring should be done prior to 
or after privatization. A number of studies consider these two processes 
counterbalancing, and thus treats them as “friends or enemies” (Aghion et al., 1994; 
Kotrba, 1996; Pohl et al., 1997; Roland, 2000). 
A special feature of restructuring in transformation economies is defensive vs. 
strategic types of restructuring, introduced by Grosfeld and Roland (1996) and Aghion 
et al. (1997) and tested for by Domadenik et al. (2008). Defensive restructuring includes 
measures that seek to reduce costs and scale down enterprise activity with the primary 
goal of the immediate survival of the enterprise. In contrast, strategic restructuring is 
based on a thoughtful business strategy developed in response to a need for a significant 
redeployment of assets (introduction of new product lines, new processes, new 
technologies, or new investments).
2 These types of restructuring came to play in broken-
up firms only after their break-up and subsequent privatization, though. In any event, 
D’Souza et al. (2007) show that restructuring and changes in corporate governance are 
important determinants of post-privatization performance. 
                                                 
2 Empirical evidence on enterprise restructuring in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic suggests that 
significant restructuring measures were mainly defensive in nature and the extent of strategic restructuring 
was much more limited (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). Domadenik et al. (2008) show that firms in Slovenia 
actively adjusted employment, and the adjustment was of both a defensive (short-term) and strategic 
(long-term) nature. Significant investment only took place in firms that were privatized, with foreign 
ownership or through retained earnings.   3
The overall expectation is that any active restructuring of an enterprise, including 
company break-up, would tend to improve operating efficiency, increase cash flow, and 
ultimately, enhance firm profitability;
3 however, it is not clear how long the effect of 
firm break-up would last, or if break-up would be the appropriate starting point for more 
active corporate governance. These general observations are valid with respect to the 
break-up of firms in the Czech Republic as well as in other CEE emerging markets 
because before the 1990’s the socialist planners preferred large firms whose size in these 
countries was excessive when compared to firm size in market economies (Hanousek et 
al., 2009). 
Although firm break-up is an important phenomenon in emerging market 
economies, surprisingly little research has been produced in the context of the CEE 
countries.Two recent contributions address the issue by employing data on Czech firms 
and show positive effects of break-ups in general. However, both have some limitations. 
Lizal et al. (2001) show that small- and medium-sized divestitures have positive effects 
on the productive efficiency and profitability of both the parent companies and divested 
units in the year when the division occurs. However, the authors do not know the 
identities of the firms and have to use indirect methods to identify divestitures and then 
link the divested units to the parent firms. Moreover, the authors can follow the firms 
only during the year of the breakup (1991) and the following year (1992). Hanousek et 
al. (2009) provide evidence of generally positive effects in divested Czech firms with 
detailed results varying across the new owners. However, their study covers only the 
two-year period (1995–1996) following the privatization of divested firms. 
Since we have richer data with an exact identification of all firms and a longer 
time span, we are able to overcome the earlier shortcomings and credibly estimate the 
effects of the break-up of firms in the Czech Republic. We analyze the effect of firm 
break-up and subsequent changes in ownership structure due to privatization, a feature 
that is frequently missing in the literature. However, ownership changes were shown by 
Cusatis et al. (1993) and Bartel and Harrison (2005) to be important. We also investigate 
the short- and medium-term effects of firm break-up, as these have been documented to 
be important (Cho and Cohen, 1997), but have not been thoroughly researched yet 
(Moschieri and Mair, 2008). 
                                                 
3 In the literature we can find also other important benefits such as synergies, innovative capabilities, 
improved resource allocation, and competitiveness (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Bergh, 1998). Further, 
according to agency theory, firm restructuring is seen as a mechanism to reduce agency costs (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Hoskisson and Turk, 1990).   4
Specifically, in this paper we contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we 
analyzeof how the break-up of firms in an emerging market affects firms’ medium-term 
economic performance. To do so, we study the performance of new units (emerging 
from the break-up), as well as the performance of the original master firms. Second, we 
study this question while accounting for endogeneity issues by employing propensity 
score matching.In our approach we consider firm break-up as the “treatment” variable 
and by estimating the medium-term effects of the break-up we study the average 
treatment effect on the treated subject (ATT). In this respect we conduct two matching 
procedures: 1) we follow the mainstream research on firm divestures and match new 
firms resulting from a break-up and those not from a break-up, and 2) we reconstruct the 
master firm performance indicators and match master firms with those not experiencing 
break-up. The combination of both approaches enables us to capture the total effect of 
the break-up. The employed dual approach, i.e., a combination of the break-up effects 
observed on new units and master firms, is an ideal application of p-score matching. 
Moreover, an identification strategy using p-score matching during the pre-privatization 
and pre-firm break-up periods should be better equipped to address endogeneity issues 
along with the attrition problem than a classical IV estimation (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002). 
An additional key value-added of the present paper is that we cover several years 
after the break-up of firms, a long enough period to uncover the medium-term effects of 
firm break-up. In the paper we show that even more than five years after firm break-up, 
the effects of firm break-up were still positive. However, the effects in subsequent years 
turned out to be negative and later insignificant as the number of observations was 
reduced substantially by the end of our sample in 2005. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline the institutional 
setting underlying our analysis and formulate the hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3 
we present our data, variables, and the method for identifying firm break-up. Section 4 
describes our estimating framework. We present our empirical results in Section 5 and 
conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. The Institutional Setting and Hypotheses 
In this section we outline the main features of the institutional setting underlying the 
surge of firm break-up in our data set. The break-up of firms took place during the 
period 1991–1992, prior to the launch of the mass privatization scheme, also known as   5
voucher privatization.
4 Hence, in the early 1990’s the government managed a wave of 
swift break-up of firms in which parent firms were broken into smaller units. This 
process resultedin no original parent firm and the state remained in control of the smaller 
units. Rapid privatization of these new units was performed and ownership was 
transferred to new private owners. 
The decisions on corporate break-up were taken by the relevant government 
ministries in conjunction with the government privatization authority. Hence, the break-
up of firms as well as privatization did not occur at random as the decision for each firm 
was based on the winning privatization project that outlined the proposed framework for 
the break-up of the firm.
5 Consequently, the endogeneity of the break-up as well as post-
privatization ownership have to be taken into account despite the fact that the decisions 
to privatize and even the specific design of the programs were dictated by politics and 
not performance criteria (Boycko et al., 1994). 
Following this surge of the break-up of firms, the new units, which were 
transformed into joint-stock companies, were privatized during 1992–1993 in the 
voucher scheme. The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process 
and two waves of voucher privatization took place in 1992–93 and 1993–94. 
Privatization was to eradicate in the quickest possible way public ownership as this was 
associated with a communist ideology.
6 Shares from the first and second wave were 
distributed in 1993 and early 1995, respectively, creating the early post-privatization 
ownership structure. There was also significant post-privatization share trading (often 
off the official stock market) among large shareholders during 1995–1996 (for details 
see Hanousek and Němeček, 2001). 
Let us note that the break-up of firms happened well before any new owners 
started to control privatized companies and therefore there was no monetary effect 
                                                 
4 A detailed description of the privatization mechanism is to a large extent irrelevant with respect to our 
analysis. For more details on the privatization process see, e.g., Kočenda (1999), Hanousek and Kočenda 
(2008), and Estrin et al. (2009), among others. 
5 The privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted 
privatization project. According to the law, all state-owned enterprises were selected either for the first or 
the second privatization wave or they were temporarily exempted. Each selected firm had to submit an 
official privatization proposal that was usually crafted by the firm’s management under the tutelage (and 
responsibility) of its sectoral ministry. Any domestic or foreign corporate body or individual was allowed 
to present a competing project that was to be considered on an equal footing with the official one. See 
Hanousek et al. (2009) for details that are beyond the scope relevant for this paper. 
6 Shleifer and Treisman (2005) show that privatization was very successful from a political point of view 
almost from the outset. However, Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) and Kočenda and Hanousek (2009) 
show that state control over privatized firms was considerable and persisted well beyond the completion of 
privatization.   6
associated with the divestiture. In other words, the break-ups did not affect the 
accounting figures of the involved companies and we can therefore use the original 
composition of the master firm to reconstruct their financial indicators even after the 
break-up of the firm. This means we can analyze the break-up from both the divested- 
and master-firm point of view to capture the total effect of the break-up. 
The structural and institutional features observed in emerging market economies 
in general, and the Czech Republic in particular, lead us to test two competing 
hypotheses with respect to firm break-up and privatization: 
1.  Break-up and privatization have a positive effect on the performance of 
the resulting units by eliminating inefficiencies such as the diseconomies of scale of 
large SOEs, weak managerial incentives and information asymmetries that existed prior 
to economic liberalization and the reduction of state control. 
2.  Divestitures and privatization have a negative effect on the performance 
of the resulting units because of weak corporate governance, waning government 
coordination and regulation, unclear property rights, and the underdeveloped legal and 
institutional framework in emerging market economies. 
  Further, the short- and medium-term effects of firm break-up were shown to be 
important (Cho and Cohen, 1997) but they have not been thoroughly researched yet 
(Moschieri and Mair, 2008). Therefore, in terms of the time effect of the break-up we 
test this hypothesis: 
  3.  Break-up does not have a permanent effect on the performance of new 
units. 
As mentioned above, we assess the total effects of the break-up of firms and test 
all hypotheses on financial indicatorsfor new firms resulting from break-up as well as 
forreconstructed indicators of the original master firms. 
 
3. Data, Identification of Break-up, and Definitions of Variables 
We deviate from the standard sequencing and introduce our data prior to describing our 
model: this set-up enables a better flow of exposition. The data originate from the wave 
of corporate break-ups orchestrated by the Czech government in the early 1990’s. The 
data were compiled by Aspekt, a commercial database, and from the archives of the 
Ministry of Privatization and the National Property Fund of the Czech Republic; the pre-
break-up descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 later in this section. The data 
allow us to identify unambiguously the parent enterprises and all new units related to the   7
surge of the break-up of firms that occurred in 1991–1992. Altogether 44 large 
enterprises were broken up into 130 new firms, the result of the numerous break-ups.
7 
Along with these 130 newly created firms, we also have data on 780 firms that did not 
experience any firm break-up and they constitute our control group. The firms in both 
groups were subsequently privatized in the first wave of the voucher scheme. This 
means that all the firms were privatized at the same time using the same privatization 
method and thus, the treatment effect of privatization affected all firms—with or without 
break-up—in a uniform manner.
8 
The institutional setting described in Section 2 has strong implications for data 
quality. Boycko et al. (1994) showed that the decision to pursue mass privatization and 
even the specific designs of the programs were largely dictated by politics. This is 
consistent with the imperative of politicians losing control in privatized firms voiced by 
Roland (1994) and Boycko et al. (1996). Hence, the early wave of firm break-up 
followed by the subsequent privatization of new units were primarily tools to prevent the 
revival of communist economic ideas rather than a profit-making enterprise for the state. 
Later privatizations of the residual state property in the 2000’s were directed more 
toward maximizing gains. Finally, based on the subsequent identified ownership 
structure available from our data, we assign each firm with an ownership corresponding 
to the following categories of owner: the state, an industrial firm, an individual owner, 
or a financial company. 
For each firm in our data set, we have detailed information derived from all the 
proposed privatization projects that were submitted to the government before 
privatization. This includes the relevant information about the break-up of the firm, the 
links between the parent (master) company and new units, the privatization scheme, and 
information on assets, liabilities, profit, sales, and number of employees in 1990. Table 1 
displays pre-firm break-up economic indicators in 1990 for the new units, parent firms, 
and firms in the control group. A key observation is that new units were more capital-
intensive and less labor-intensive than non-broken firms. A striking difference can also 
be observed in the number of privatization projects submitted for new units, which 
                                                 
7 These new firms received new tax identification numbers and had the same rights to use the brand and/or 
trade name of the former parent enterprise. Originally there were 131 new firms but we use only 130 of 
them since for one divested firm no relevant data covering the period under research are available. 
8 In this scheme altogether 988 firms were privatized. This means that there are only 77 firms (8% of the 
total) for which the data are dubious due to legal problems associated with privatization and we do not 
include them in our sample. Due to the high percentage of firms not experiencing break-up and the 
complete set of new firms in the data set, there is virtually no truncation involved in our case.   8
greatly exceeds that for non-broken firms. This difference points to greater interest in 
new units and bigger expectations for them on the part of potential investors. For many 
enterprises there were several privatization projects submitted and their number was 
directly and primarily related to the number of divisions within each firm or the number 
of units into which a firm could be naturally divided. Each privatization project reflected 
the structure of the firm, managers’ motives, degree of investor interest, and expected 
future performance of the firm. However, prior to firm break-up and privatization, the 
non-broken firms exhibit better performance measured by scaled profit and sales than 
new units.
9 
Finally, in Figure 1 we illustrate the average performance developments in firms 
with and without break-up after the break-up of firms and privatization. We present four 
indicators of corporate performance recorded with a yearly frequency: the operating 
profit per total assets to show unit performance irrespective of size, the operating profit 
per equity to allow for changes in capital structure, the profit over staff costs to provide a 
perspective on differences in cost effectiveness among firms, and finally a value-added 
as a complementary standard productivity measure. Using all firms for which data are 
available in a given year, we compute and plot the mean values for firms with and 
without break-up during the post-break-up and post-privatization period (1996–2005). In 
terms of profit indicators, we observe a stable upward trend that is most pronounced for 
profit per total assets and staff costs and less pronounced in the case of profit per equity. 
In both upward trends new units also record higher performance than non-broken firms, 
especially in terms of the labor productivity measure. All the profit measures exhibit 
some degree of seasonality with a sharp drop in 1999 that echoes the poor economic 
performance and the country’s negative aggregate growth in 1998. Other ups and downs 
are likely to reflect less-than-complete reporting by firms rather than economic reasons. 
Primarily, in later years we observe a sizeable drop in the number of observations for 
both new units and non-broken firms. The reasons why some firms are not recorded in 
our panel data set in later years are: a) they were acquired, b) they underwent a 
bankruptcy procedure, or c) those firms were no longer required to regularly publish 
their annual income statements by law and thus failed to do so. Unfortunately, we were 
not able to fully distinguish the reasons for each firm. Finally, the value-added indicator 
                                                 
9 Let us note that domestic accounting standards in the early years of transition reflected more the 
production side of business activities rather than corporate profits. However, since we compare firms 
within the same industrial sector the possible discrepancies are minimized.   9
shows consistently better performance of new units over non-broken firms, albeit with a 
considerable drop during the period 2001–2005. 
To conclude, generally positive performance findings at first glance show a 
better position for new firms resulting from break-up during the whole period under 
research. This observation should be viewed with a caution as developments of the 
performance indicators are presented for all firms for which data were available in a 
given year. Hence, these are raw data that have no way to present a true picture in which 
the endogeneity of firm break-up and ownership change with respect to performance 
could be properly processed and accounted for. This task will be performed in the next 
step. First we introduce our methodology (Section 4) and then empirical findings 
(Section 5). 
 
4. The Estimating Framework 
4.1 General Outline 
From the methodology perspective the break-up of a firm represents a treatment that is 
present in a group of divested firms but absent in a control group of firms that did not 
experience a break-up.
10 Since firms’ break-up and subsequent changes in ownership 
structure can be correlated with firms’ unobserved characteristics, the explanatory 
variables related to firm break-up and ownership have to be treated as endogenous. The 
endogeneity issue related to the Czech surge of break-ups has been dealt with by 
Hanousek et al. (2009), who modeled corporate performance as a function of the 
presence or absence of a firm break-up and type of ownership structure. Since the 
explanatory variables related to firm break-up and ownership structure were found to be 
endogenous, they used instrumental variables in their estimation.
11 In particular, they 
used a logit equation to model the break-up of a company and subsequent changes in its 
ownership structure, with the explanatory variables being predetermined and exogenous 
with respect to the break-up of the firm and privatization. This regression-based 
                                                 
10 In a similar fashion Jurajda and Stancik (2009) consider the foreign takeover of Czech firms as a 
treatment and analyze its effect on firm performance. 
11 Hanousek et al. (2009) used the following IVs: the number of privatization projects submitted to the 
government in 1991, the extent of how much the size of each firm deviates in 1990 from the standard size 
of a firm in a specific industry in the OECD economies, the ownership structure proposed in 1991 in the 
winning privatization project (expressed in the percentage intended for a particular ownership type), the 
profitability of the parent firm prior to privatization and break-up (in 1990), and the total number of shares 
per parent firm in 1990 (e.g., total assets). The effects of variables such as the firm’s distance from the 
mean OECD size, profitability, and total number of shares can be nonlinear and a Taylor series expansion 
of the second and third orders were used to formulate a specification that took into account potential 
nonlinearities.   10
approach is suitable provided adequate instruments are available and the time span is 
adequate. 
In our analysis we take a different approach, though. In order to capture the total 
effect of the break-up of a firm we need to analyze the effects of the break-up on both 
the new units resulting from the break-up as well as on the original master firms. 
Obviously, the employed method should account for the possible endogenous character 
of the break-up along with sample selection due to potential data attrition. As time goes 
on some firms might fail to report data or even completely disappear. Then, it is natural 
that as less data becomes available, the estimation and identification of the desired 
effects becomes less accurate and meaningful. 
For the reasons articulated above we use in our analysis propensity score 
matching and DID estimation instead of the classical IV approach. This allows us to 
correctly study the medium-term effects of firm break-up on corporate performance 
while accounting for endogeneity issues. To do so, we study the performance of new 
units as well as the performance of the original master firms. We consider firm break-up 
as the “treatment” variable and we study the average treatment effect on the treated 
subject (ATT). In this respect we conduct two matching procedures. First, we follow the 
mainstream of the research on firm divestures and match new firms resulting from a 
break-up with those not experiencing break-up. Second, we reconstruct master firm 
performance indicators and match master firms with those not experiencing break-up. 
The combination of both approaches enables us to capture the total effect of the break-
up. This dual approach, i.e., a combination of the break-up effects observed on new units 
and master firms, is an ideal application of p-score matching. 
Further, an identification strategy using p-score matching during the pre-
privatization and pre-firm break-up period can also better address endogeneity issues 
together with the data attrition problem when compared with the IV technique (Dehejia 
and Wahba, 2002). This is because we are interested in the effect of firm break-up; other 
influences are of secondary interest but we still control for them. In the case of p-score 
matching the proper evaluation of the impact of a break-up on the performance of a firm 
involves speculation about how this firm would have performed if it was not divested 
(see Roy, 1951 and Rubin, 1974 for earlier references). The matching approach in the 
context of our research is based on the idea of comparing the performance of treated 
versus non-treated firms (e.g., new units versus non-broken firms) based on observable 
characteristics common to both. The comparison is used to interpret the difference in   11
their post-treatment performance as an effect of firm break-up (and of subsequent 
ownership). 
Formally, we use the standard approach to evaluate the treatment effects of the 
break-up of a firm. As it has become standard, we employ a binary treatment indicator 
DIVi that equals one if firm i is a new unit resulting from break-up (divested) and zero 
otherwise. The potential firm performance is then defined as Yi(DIVi) for each firm i in 
the sample, where i = 1,…N and N denotes the total number of observations. 
The parameter that has been widely used in the evaluation literature is the so-
called average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is defined as: 
 
11 [| 1 ] [ | 1 ] [ | 0 ] ATT E treatment DIV E Y DIV E Y DIV == = = − = .     (1) 
 
From the perspective of the general type of divestiture the ATT measures the difference 
in the potential performance of a divested firm in the two states of being and not being 
divested. Because we do not observe the mean for divested firms, we have to define an 
appropriate alternative for it as E[Y1| DIV = 0] in order to estimate the ATT. A widely 
used strategy is to assume that for a given subset of observable variables X that are not 
affected by firm break-up, the potential firm outcome is independent of treatment 
indicator Di. In a seminal paper Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest to use so-called 
balancing scores to overcome the dimensionality problem in X. The independence of a 
potential outcome given a set of variables X is then transferred to conditional 
independence on a balancing score b(X). 
The propensity score P(DIV = 1|X) = P(X), i.e., the probability for a firm to be 
divested given its observed covariates X, is the suitable balancing score. The propensity 
score (p-score) is then formally defined as 
 
     ,        ,        1 ,                   ,        ,        0 ,         . (2) 
 
Using the propensity score, the p-score estimator for ATT can be written as 
 
      
           |           ,          1 ,                ,   |      0 ,            , 
 
or in simplified notation,   12
 
              |           |      1,           |      0,      .   (3) 
 
The time index t indicates the sequencing and proper variables used: break-up 
(divestiture) happened at time t, conditioning for p-score matching is done on pre-firm 
break-up characteristics (Xt-1), and the evaluation of ATT occurs several periods after the 
break-up of the firm. Basically, the ATT
PSM estimator is nothing but the mean difference 
in firm performance over the common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity 
score distribution of matched firms. Under such assumptions the matching method 
results in an unbiased estimate of the treatment impact such as firm break-up; for more 
discussion of the treatment effect see Dehejia and Wahba (2002) or Smith and Todd 
(2005), among others. 
Despite the fact that the literature on matching estimators considers several kinds 
of estimators, the ATT
PSM defined in (3) that uses adifference-in-differences (DID) 
matching technique is considered a superior estimator.
12 The DID matching estimator 
allows for temporally invariant differences in outcomes between treated and control 
(non-treated) units that can arise (Smith and Todd, 2005). The property that the DID 
matching estimator eliminates time-invariant differences in performance between 
divested and non-divested firms is counterbalanced by the fact that the DID matching 
estimator is more data-demanding and requires the use of longitudinal data before and 
after treatment and a suitable set of conditioning variables for pair matching. 
Since we employ panel data we greatly benefit from the DID matching 
estimator’s quality. Further, we use a set of conditioning variables—i.e., pre-firm break-
up characteristics such as the size of the firm, industrial sector, and pre-break-up (and 
pre-privatization) performance indicators, along with proxies for the future ownership 
structure—that satisfy the required conditions. Therefore, in the present paper we 
employ propensity score matching that fully accounts for the outlined endogeneity and is 
well suited for our purpose due to the longitudinal character of our data. 
 
4.2 Our Estimation Approach 
                                                 
12 The literature on matching estimators considers several kinds of matching algorithms, which leads to 
different estimators with particular properties like a) nearest-neighbor matching, b) caliper matching, c) 
kernel matching, or d) local-linear matching.   13
As mentioned in the previous sections, we estimate the causal average effect of 
treatment on the treated subject (ATT), i.e., the effect of break-up on new units. 
Specifically, we test these effects 1) on the new units that emerged from a break-up (130 
firms) with respect to those that did not experience break-up (780 firms) and 2) on 
original master firms (44 firms) that were broken-up with respect to those that were not 
(780 firms). The first set of ATT effects is a mainstream result while the second set 
serves as a complementary result. 
In the above outline Yj is a measure of the corporate performance of new units 
resulting from break-up (j=1, DIVt = 1) or firms that were not broken (j=0, DIVt = 0). 
The period when we compare firm performance is 1996–2006; the initial period t0 refers 
to 1996, after the post-privatization changes in ownership structures were settled. Our 
estimator of interest ATT introduced in (3) therefore reflects the difference in 
performance between the current (t0+k) and initial period (t0). Similar to other matching 
studies, we match firms within the same industrial sector. 
First, it is possible to estimate the causal effect of firm break-up on firm 
performance by assuming that firm break-up is as good as random conditional on the 
observed characteristics among the firms that have a similar predicted probability of 
being subject to break-up (divested)                   1 |     , where t denotes the 
time of the break-up of the firm. Then, the causal effect is defined as the difference 
between the average performance over k years of firms (denoted as 
     ,        ,        1  ) that became new units after the break-up (were divested) and 
the hypothetical performance of the same firms had they not been divested (denoted as 
     ,        ,        1  ). The probability of being divested (the propensity score) is 
assumed to depend on a set of pre-firm break-up (as well as pre-privatization) 
observable characteristics. The fact that we are able to use for matching pre-firm break-
up firm-specific variables, whose values were set by central planners independently of 
what firms would subsequently do in a market setting, makes them quality-conditioning 
variables.The variables used in estimating p-scores represent measures of the size, 
industrial sector, and scaled performance of firms. Specifically, we consider the 
probability of firm break-up as the function 
 
                    ,        ,           ,      ,   ,   (4) 
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where we consider various functional forms of size (log of capital, capital, and capital 
squared), industrial sectors, and pre-firm break-up indicators represented by sales per 
total assets (s_tns) and profit per total assets (p_tns). To capture the future ownership 
structure we consider the proxies derived from privatization projects: the percentage of 
shares held by investment privatization funds (ipf) and municipalities (munic). With 
these two variables we control for the initial ownership structure intended for privatized 
firms. In addition we also employ a relative excess employment variable (DEi)to control 
for differences in firm size. In the logit specification we also use some of these variables 
squared.In Table 2 we list all the observables introduced above. The financial and 
economic characteristics are easy to understandand we provide the necessary intuitionfor 
the rest of the variables below. 
The relative excess employment (DEi) variable and its construction corresponds 
to the fact that central planners tended to establish and maintain very large firms, both 
because it was easier to control a few large (rather than many small) firms and because 
of the prevailing political philosophy to build large firms under a command regime. 
Thus, relative excess employment (DEi) is a matching criterion that measures the 
number of employees in a firm in 1990 minus the number of employees in a (weighted) 
average firm belonging to the same industrial sector in the OECD economies in the same 
period (see Kumar et al., 1999).
13 
Finally, the proportions of assets held by investment privatization funds and 
municipalities are proxies for corporate governance. Investment privatization funds held 
substantial stakes in privatized firms, pursued profitable opportunities, and were also 
found to engage in defensive restructuring by reducing employment (Hanousek et al., 
2007). Hence, they are taken as a proxy for the extent of corporate governance. 
Municipalities received various ownership stakes as free property transfers and became 
stakeholders in numerous companies, mainly in utilities and transportation, but being a 
                                                 
13We take the mean OECD firm size as a benchmark because the transition countries declared their 
commitment to move towards a standard market economy and many, including the Czech Republic, 
succeeded in joining the OECD in 1995, soon after the start of the transition. One of the determining 
factors for a divestiture is therefore likely to be the size of the firms that emerged from the centrally 
planned system, relative to the size of firms in established market (OECD) economies. Since the socialist 
planners preferred large firms, the relative employment variable (DEi) captures effectively the excessive 
size of enterprises under central planning relative to the firm size in market economies and serves as a 
matching variable. 
The DEi variable can also be understood as an instrument for divestiture. We run our matching 
procedure without this variable but the results (available upon request) were not materially different as we 
primarily control for the size of the company and industrial sector, which indirectly corresponds to the 
definition of DEi.   15
part of the state ownership structure they did not pursue an overly active role in the 
companies (Kočenda and Hanousek, 2009). They are then taken as a proxy for weak 
corporate governance. 
For all observables listed in Table 2 we provide marginal effects along with the 
p-value of the marginal effectfor each variable. To capture the possible heavier tail 
distribution we primarily employed a logit model, however, we also checked that a 
probit model yields very similar results. Since the purpose of estimating equation (4) is 
classification rather than the estimation of underlying structural coefficients, the optimal 
choice of the underlying functional form is not an issue (Smith, 1997). 
The estimated p-scores are later used to control for influential factors in the score 
matching procedure. We can derive several key observations from the table. The size of 
the firm measured by the log of capital is a key factor behind firm break-up. The 
marginal effect shows that the bigger the firm the greater the probability of the break-up 
occurrence.
14 A similar observation can be made for marginal effects associated with 
other variables. However, in most cases the effect is economically marginal. Finally, 
based on relatively high values of R
2 and stable results across different specifications we 
conclude that the employed variables adequately characterize firms for the propensity 
score matching procedure. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Effect of break-up on new units 
We present our results in Tables 3 and 4. For estimation we used STATA 10 and 
specifically we employ the standard procedure psmatch2 implemented by Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003), with kernel matching using a Gaussian kernel. Standard errors were 
obtained by using bootstrapping methods. An additional STATA procedure pstest was 
used for covariate imbalance testing. 
First we show performance results measured in terms of operating profit scaled 
by total assets and operating profit scaled by firm equity (Table 3). Scaling by total 
assets helps to put the performance indicator into the perspective of the firm’s 
profitability irrespective of its size. The second measure complements the information 
on performance by accounting for changes in capital structure, as equity can often 
change over time. Further, we use profit over staff costs as a measure of labor 
                                                 
14 We also include the results of the p-score estimation where we exclude different measures of firm size.   16
productivity and finally a value-added as a complementary standard productivity 
measure (Table 4). 
In Tables3 and 4, separately for each year we present the average treatment 
effect on treated firms (ATT) along with the statistical significance of the effect. Treated 
firms are the new firms resulting from the break-up of the master firm andthe average 
treatment effects on treated firms show time-dependent positive or negative differences 
in the performance of new firms with respect to the performance of non-treated firms 
(without break-up). For example, in 1996 new firms recorded a profit over total assets 
that was 0.039 times larger than the profits of non-broken firms. In the same year the 
profit over equity of new firms was 0.628 times larger when compared with non-broken 
companies (Table 3). In 1996 profit over staff costs were 1.587 times larger and the 
value-added was 6.035 times larger in new firms when compared to non-broken firms 
(Table 4). In 1997 the effects related to profit over total assets and profit over equity 
were even larger than in 1996, while the profit over staff costs and value-added were 
smaller but still positive and statistically significant. The situation changes afterwards. 
The observed effects presented in Tables 3 and 4 are quite uneven: after growing 
gradually, there is a sharp drop into negative territory. In more detail, at the beginning of 
the researched period new firms resulting from the break-up of the master firms exhibit 
better performance than non-broken firms. This positive difference gradually increases 
for a limited period of time and quickly reaches its peak around 1997–1998. During the 
subsequent stage the positive differences become negative when statistically significant 
values are available. For the rest of the observed period values become mostly negative, 
albeit without being statistically significant. Therefore, judgment has to be made 
carefully as the numbers of observed data for both new and non-broken firms were 
dropping considerably in the later years of our sample. As our paper is the first attempt 
to analyze the medium- and long-term effects of the break-up of firms we acknowledge 
the fact that due to the drop in the treated sample size after 1999 we cannot possibly 
capture the long-term effect in full. However, we report the results for all years for 
which we have data along with changes in the treated sample for the sake of 
completeness. We observe that the effect of firm break-up rapidly dissipates. Since 
break-up was the initial form of restructuring, the intuition behind this result is that the 
performance-enhancing potential of the break-up was exhausted quickly. Hence, later 
improvements in the performance of firms had to be due to other factors. Based on the   17
relevant literature we conjecture that the most likely factors were changes in ownership 
structure and management (see Roland, 2000; Estrin at al., 2009). 
  The values of the observed effects in Tables 3 and 4 are based on the large total 
number of matched observations between treated and non-treated firms, e.g. the total 
number of firms that were exposed to matching (shown in the column labeled N). 
Further, we show the number of new units used for matching that were successfully 
matched with adequate firms not experiencing break-up based on a set of matching 
indicators (column N treated matched). Finally, we show the number of non-broken 
(control) firms used for matching (column N controls matched). The ratios between the 
total number of firms used for matching (N) and the number of matched firms emerging 
from break-up (N treated matched) vary over time. In the majority of the years these 
ratios exceed 10%. In many years they are well below 50%, though. Thus, the range of 
these ratios suggests that the common support problem could be a relevant concern in 
these data. For this reason, we perform a thorough check of the results presented in 
Tables 3 and 4 to assess how well the propensity score did to balance observables across 
the matched new units (treated) and non-broken (control) firms. We perform a series of 
balancing tests, e.g., the two-sample t-tests suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
The results of the balancing tests are presented in Table 5. The key finding of our 
balancing tests is shown in the last column, which records the p-values of the test for the 
treated and control groups. Bold p-values for matched variables clearly indicate that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equality of treated and control groups for all 
compared variables. Hence, there is no systematic difference in the distribution of 
covariates after matching. Moreover, the results of our estimations presented above are 
based on variables that were proven to be exogenous.
15 Our results (Tables 3 and 4) are 
then based on a correctly specified procedure as well as an appropriate selection of 
variables. 
 
5.2 Effect of break-up on master firms 
The decision to break up firms was taken and carried out when all the firms under 
research, including the firms in our control group that were not broken, were state-
owned companies. The decision to breakup those firms had no monetary effect on any 
firm involved. Therefore, we can use (accounting) performance indicators of new units 
                                                 
15The results of these tests are not presented, but they are available upon request.   18
from the post-break-up period to construct artificial key performance indicators of the 
master firm as if the firm was not broken up into several new units. This approach 
allows us to analyze the combined effect of the break-up on all the firms coming from 
the original master firm and thus the estimated ATT effect captures the total effect of the 
break-up of the firm. The results are then compared to those obtained in Section 5.1. To 
obtain the results of the ATT effects we use exactly the same step-by-step approach as 
described earlier with a single exception: to match firms we use single-digit industry 
codes as some of the new units have slightly different double-digit industry codes than 
the master firm. 
We show our results in Table 6, where we present the average treatment effect on 
treated firms (ATT) along with the statistical significance of the effect. Treated firms are 
now the original master firms. The average treatment effects on treated firms show time-
dependent positive or negative differences in the performance of the original master 
firms with respect to the performance of non-treated firms (without break-up). The 
performance of master firms was artificially constructed based on the performance 
indicators of the new firms resulting from the break-up of the original master firm. 
Due to the fact that the number of master firms suitable for matching drops to an 
insufficiently low level after 1999, we present our results for the period 1996–1999. 
Despite this limitation our results are consistent with those presented in Tables 3–4. In 
1996–1997master firms showed increasing positive profits that were to different extents 
larger than the profits of non-broken firms; coefficients related to value-added are 
statistically insignificant and prevent interpretation. The pattern broke down in 1998 and 
profits over assets and equity became negative, albeit statistically insignificant. Profit 
over staff costs became statistically insignificant as well but coefficient values remained 
positive. These results indicate two key interpretations. First, initial restructuring in the 
form of a break-up worked as, on average, new firms prospered better than non-broken 
firms; artificially composed master firms showed better performance as well. Second, 
restructuring brought pressure to lower costs through wages: when we inspect the ATT 
results of new firms’ performance in the form of master firm performance we see that 
master firm profits over staff costs was consistently positive and superior with respect to 
non-broken firms. Hence, in new firms the pressure on staff costs was greater, possibly 
due the initiated restructuring. 
  Finally, in Figures 2–3 we present a summary of our findings in graphical form. 
In both figures we show the development of all four performance indicators over the   19
period 1996–1999 for both new firms as well as the artificially constructed master firms. 
This presentation also shows the variability of coefficients and their statistical 
significance. Smaller bars mean smaller variability. Bars above or below the zero 
threshold mean statistical significance while bars crossing the zero threshold indicate 
statistical insignificance. Both new and master firms consistently show initial 
improvements over non-broken firms that disappear after 1998. Thus, the total effect of 
a break-up is shown to be consistent with effects found in separate new firms. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We analyzed the effects of corporate divestures and ownership changes on firm 
performance in an emerging European market. We employed a unique data set for a 
large number of Czech firms over the period 1996–2006. In our analysis we accounted 
for ensuing changes in ownership structure due to privatization and the endogeneity of 
performance with respect to firm break-up and privatization. Regression-based 
techniques often suffer from a lack of so-called “common support” when the 
characteristics of new units coming from break-up differ from firms that were not 
broken up. Therefore, we employed a propensity score matching procedure that fully 
accounted for endogeneity and was well suited for our purpose due to the panel 
character of our data. 
Our results show that five years after the wave of firm break-up took place, the 
effects of firm break-up are positive. However, later on, after the post-firm break-up and 
post-privatization events settled down, the primarily positive effect of firm break-up 
dissipated very fast and in two to three years (from the beginning of our sample) it 
became negative or statistically indistinguishable (Tables 3 and 4). These results are in 
contrast to the development of post-firm break-up and post-privatization positive 
performance obtained from raw data (Figure 1). The reason behind this difference 
centers on the use of a proper procedure that accounts for the endogeneity of firm break-
up and ownership change with respect to performance. In order to verify our results we 
performed proper balancing tests to show that our results are based on a sound procedure 
employing an adequate set of variables. In addition, we artificially constructed 
performance indicators for the original master firms and showed the same performance 
pattern as in the new units. 
In general, our results are in line with the positive effects of firm break-up found 
in the literature covering developed markets. However, we show that within five to   20
seven years after divesture and even sooner after the subsequent privatization these 
effects disappear. Since break-up was the initial form of restructuring we believe that the 
performance-enhancing potential of firm break-up was exhausted quickly. 
Consequently, factors like changes in ownership structure and management are to be 
found behind later improvements in the performance of firms.   21
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Table 1 










Divested 130 640 4330 15.8  49,200
Not divested  780 301 748 2.2  9,390
All firms  910 350 1770 2.2  49,200
Number of 
employees 
Divested 130 822 1907 23  17880
Not divested  780 1156 3049 3  49701
All firms  910 1108 2915 3  49701
Profit per 
share 
Divested 129 0.89 4.28 -16.94  30.95
Not divested  778 1.05 6.29 -15.59  90.38
All firms  907 1.02 6.04 -16.94  90.38
Sales per 
share 
Divested 130 11.73 32.97 0.01  266.17
Not divested  779 12.10 41.52 0.00  461.36




Divested 130 13.48 18.68 1.00  77.00
Not divested  780 2.96 4.38 1.00  41.00
All firms  910 4.46 8.92 1.00  77.00
 
Source: Privatization databases, authors’ computations. 
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Table 2 
P-score Estimation (divested firms) 
variable dy/dx  z  P>z  dy/dx  z  P>z dy/dx  z  P>z  Mean  (X) 
lnc -5.26E-02  -2.50
b 0.01 -5.45E-02 -2.79
a 0.01 11.75
tns 4.59E-08  1.03  0.30 4.32E-08 0.93 0.35 3.47E+05
tns2 -2.72E-15  -0.69  0.49 -5.80E-15 -1.43 0.15 4.10E+12
s_tns 5.51E-04  0.99  0.32 9.08E-04 1.64 0.10
c 5.62E-04 1.10 0.31 11.37
p_tns -3.08E-03  -0.73  0.47 -3.45E-03 -0.79 0.43 -3.11E-03 -0.73 0.47 1.10
ipf -3.38E-08  -0.16  0.88 -3.05E-07 -1.58 0.11 1.19E-07 1.14 0.26 1.37E+05
excess_e -2.20E-05  -1.25  0.21 -2.80E-05 -1.55 0.12 -2.23E-05 -1.27 0.21 388.15
municip -1.54E-03  -0.13  0.90 -2.50E-03 -0.21 0.83 -2.32E-03 -0.20 0.84 1.00
(ipf)^2 4.13E-14  0.59  0.56 1.18E-13 1.65 0.10
c 5.61E-16 0.03 0.98 2.80E+11
(municip)^2 9.98E-04  1.30  0.19 1.04E-03 1.28 0.20 1.02E-03 1.35 0.18 11.51
(excess_e)^2 4.11E-10  0.67 0.51 5.66E-10 0.91 0.36 4.22E-10 0.69 0.49 1.20E+07
R2=0.127 R2=0.117  R2=0.126 
Number of observations:  670  670 670
 
Notes:   
The table contains the marginal effects for each variable (i.e., derivatives dy/dx). The variable _pscore denotes p-score matching, lnc stands for ln(capital), tns and (tns)^2 
denotethe total number of shares and the total number of shares squared, respectively; s_tns and p_tns stand for sales and profit per share, respectively. The variable ipf 
denotes the percentage of shares held by investment privatization funds; the variable excess_e corresponds to the mean excess of the number of employees with respect to 
similar firms in OECD countries. The variable Municip denotes the percentage of shares originally transferred to and held by municipalities. Finally, variables (ipf)^2 and 




ATT Results for Operational Profit over Total Assets and Equity 
(new units resulting from break-up) 
 
Operational Profit over Total Assets 





b   1.80  694  87  607 
1997 0.074
c   2.09  671  79  592 
1998  -0.038
c -3.40  636  78  558 
1999 -0.021
b -1.65  579  71  508 
2000 -0.021 -0.15  197  9  188 
2001 -0.013 -0.07  188  9  179 
2002  -0.027  -0.22 187  9  178 
2003  0.003   0.29  179  9  170 
2004  -0.021  -0.06 167  8  159 
2005  -0.033  -0.63 146  6  140 
Operational Profit over Equity 





b   1.72  693  87  606 
1997 0.699
c   2.91  670  79  591 
1998  0.066   0.47  634  78  556 
1999 -0.060
c -2.16  579  71  508 
2000 -0.122
b -1.81  197  9  188 
2001 -0.202 -1.50  188  9  179 
2002  0.018   0.21  187  9  178 
2003  0.016   0.21  179  9  170 
2004  -0.022  -0.21 167  8  159 
2005  -0.072  -0.67 146  6  140 
 
Note: ATT denotes the average treatment effect on treated. It is the effect of the break-up (treatment) on 
the particular performance variable in new units resulting from the break-up. t-stat is the corresponding t-
statistics, N denotes the total number of observations, and N treated matched and N controls matched 
denote the number of matched divested firms and the number of matched non-divested firms, respectively. 
The statistical significance of the coefficients is denoted as follows: a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). 
    26
Table 4 
ATT Results for Operational Profit over Staff Costs and Value Added 
(new units resulting from break-up) 
 
Operational Profit over Staff Costs 





c   2.07  496  81  415 
1997 1.378   1.54  474  76  398 
1998  -0.550 -0.45  442  72  370 
1999 -0.717
c -1.98  383  68  315 
2000 -9.705
c -8.41  84  7  77 
2001 -0.266 -1.15  68  2  66 
2002  -2.952  -0.05 77  4  73 
2003  0.016   0.09  72  7  65 
2004  -5.760   0.70  62  5  57 
2005  -5.240  -0.76 46  2  44 
Value Added 




1996 6,035   0.42  501  81  420 
1997 3,210   0.20  482  79  403 
1998  -2,584 -0.12 448  73  375 
1999 -2,452 -0.09  384 68  316 
2000 -82,848 -0.56 84  7  77 
2001 -67,574 -0.74 82  4  78 
2002  -45,740 -0.36 80  5  75 
2003  -4,693 -0.04 76  7  69 
2004  -10,936 -0.07 71  8  63 
2005  -15,874 -0.11 48  2  46 
 
Note: ATT denotes the average treatment effect on treated. It is the effect of the break-up (treatment) on 
the particular performance variable in new units resulting from the break-up. t-stat is the corresponding t-
statistics, N denotes the total number of observations, and N treated matched and N controls matched 
denote the number of matched divested firms and number of matched non-divested firms, respectively. 
The statistical significance of the coefficients is denoted as follows: a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%).   27
Table 5 












_pscore  Unmatched  0.20 0.12 51.1 35.36 0.000
Matched  0.14 0.13 3.9 92.4 0.35  0.730
Lnc  Unmatched  11.59 11.71 -9.3 -4.16 0.000
Matched  11.54 11.65 -8.9 4.2 -0.58  0.562
Tns  Unmatched  6.40E+05 3.00E+05 11 8.34 0.000
Matched  2.80E+05 2.80E+05 0 99.9 0.00  0.997
(tns)^2  Unmatched  1.90E+13 6.50E+11 12.3 9.98 0.000
Matched  5.00E+11 5.90E+11 -0.1 99.5 -0.14  0.890
s_tns  Unmatched  11.73 12.11 -1 -0.40 0.689
Matched  11.48 10.15 3.6 -258.9 0.23  0.819
p_tns  Unmatched  0.89 1.05 -2.9 -1.10 0.269
Matched  0.87 0.75 2.2 22.6 0.20  0.843
Ipf  Unmatched  2.10E+05 1.30E+05 11.3 8.08 0.000
Matched  1.30E+05 1.30E+05 0.6 94.4 0.09  0.926
excess_e  Unmatched  -302.94 630.86 -25.6 -11.70 0.000
Matched  285.00 31.50 6.9 72.9 0.54  0.592
Municip  Unmatched  2.40 0.59 42 28.07 0.000
Matched  1.00 0.81 4.5 89.3 0.41  0.680
(ipf)^2  Unmatched  1.20E+12 8.80E+10 12.8 10.33 0.000
Matched  1.50E+11 1.00E+11 0.5 96 0.37  0.711
(excess_e)^2  Unmatched  1.50E+07 1.20E+07 3.40 1.37 0.170
Matched  5.50E+07 1.60E+06 3.60 -14.6 0.88  0.382
(municip)^2  Unmatched  39.45 3.95 37.1 28.35 0.000
Matched  9.95 8.16 1.9 95 0.24  0.807
 
Notes:  The variable _pscore denotes p-score matching, lnc stands for ln(capital), tns and (tns)^2 denote 
the total number of shares and the total number of shares squared, respectively; s_tns and p_tns stand for 
sales and profit per share. The variable ipf denotes the percentage of shares hold by investment 
privatization funds; the variable excess_e corresponds to the mean excess of the number of employees 
with respect to similar firms in OECD countries. The percentage of shares originally transferred to and 
held by municipalities is captured by the variable Municip. Finally, the variables (ipf)^2 and (municip)^2 
capture the results for the quadratic versions of ipf and municip, respectively. The last column shows the 
comparisons of treated and control groups; bold-type p-values clearly indicate that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of the equality of treated and control groups for all compared variables.   28
Table 6 
ATT Results for Master firms 
Operational Profit over Total Assets 






b 1.71 646 20 626 
1997  0.054
a 2.29 624 15 609 
1998  -0.046 -0.63 598 15 583 
1999  -0.011 -0.41 543 14 529 
Operational Profit over Equity 






 a 2.38 645 20 625 
1997  0.510 0.40 623 15 608 
1998  -1.043 -1.14 596 15 581 
1999  -0.830 -0.79 543 14 529 
Operational Profit over Staff Costs 






 a 2.57 637 18 619 
1997  2.05
 b 1.94 616 15 601 
1998  3.50 0.78 588 15 573 
1999  0.70 1.11 532 11 521 
Value-added 





1996  139927 1.22 646 20 626 
1997  137042 1.31 623 15 608 
1998  -63990 -1.25 597 15 582 
1999  53168 0.41 541 14 527 
 
Note: ATT denotes the average treatment effect on treated. It is the effect of the break-up (treatment) on 
the particular performance variable in master firms. The performance variable of the master firm was 
constructed based on the performance variables of the new units resulting from the break-up of the 
specific master firm. t-stat is the corresponding t-statistics, N denotes the total number of observations, 
and N treated matched and N controls matched denote the number of matched master firms (divested) and 
number of matched non-divested firms, respectively. The statistical significance of the coefficients is 
denoted as follows: a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). 
    29
Figure 1 
Post-firm Break-up and Post-privatization Performance 
A) Profit over Assets       B) Profit over Equity 
 
 
     C)  Profit over Staff Costs     D) Value Added 
 
Note: Above we illustrate the average performance developments in new units emerging after break-up as 
well as non-broken firms after firm break-up and privatization were put into effect. Mean performance 
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Figure 2 
Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) for Selected Performance Indicators: 
Graphical Summary for New Units as well as Artificially Reconstructed Master Firms 
 
A) Profit over Assets       B) Profit over Equity 
 
 
     C)  Profit over Staff Costs     D) Value-added 
 
 
Note: Vertical bars represent 10% double side confidence intervals for ATT, i.e., measuring the effect of 
firm break-up with respect to the chosen performance indicator. Shadow bars represent ATT for new units 
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